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Introduction
Before the rise of law and economics, the Supreme Court
decided several cases involving patent holders' attempts to
use trademark doctrines to slow down competitors after the
expiration of their utility patents; in each of these cases, the
Court enforced a public right to use material in the public
domain.' To give one famous example, Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co.,2 the "shredded wheat case," came to the Court
after the expiration of a product and process utility patent on
that once-innovative breakfast cereal. The Court held that a
competitor could freely copy the product's name and its well
known pillow-shaped form because both had entered the
public domain when the patent expired. While disagreeing on
the showing required to allow copying, five United States
circuit courts have recently unanimously declined to follow
Kellogg.
This term, the Court revisits the Kellogg issue in Trafix
Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc.3 This article explains
why the Supreme Court got it right the first time.4 The issue
in Kellogg and Marketing Displays belongs to the Court's area
of greatest expertise: the United States Constitution. The
Court has no need to enter the less hospitable arena of
economic theory.5
My thesis is that Article One, Section Eight, Clause Eight
of the United States Constitution6 allows7 Congress to create
1. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 186 (1896); Coats v. Merrick Thread, Co.,
149 U.S. 562, 572 (1893).
2. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
3. 200 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000) (No.
99-1571).
4. See also Amtcus Brief [of Malla Pollack] Supporting Petitioner, TrafFix
Devices, Inc., TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. (U.S. Sup. Ct. No.
99-1571) (presenting this thesis).
5. With all due respect to the law and economics movement, the Supreme
Court may be well advised to leave economic theory to others. The point of
Justice Holmes' dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905)
(Holmes, J., dissenting), is that the majority incorrectly "sought to impose a
particular economic philosophy upon the Constitution." College Sav. Bank v.
Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Edu. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 691 (1999).
6. "Congress shall have the power... To promote the progress of science
and useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the
HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. [VOL. 22:265
individual ownership in intellectual "property" only to the
extent that such privatization respects the public's
constitutional right to the public domain. The public domain
is "owned" in inalienable, indivisible common by the public,
not the federal government. The form of this ownership is a
right not to be excluded. Therefore, neither the courts nor
Congress have the power to redraw the public domain's
boundaries in pursuit of some now-current economic theory.
The first section of this article discusses the Lockian
conception of property, which may stand behind the
Constitution. The second provides my suggestion for
interpreting the words of the Intellectual Property Clause. The
third section explains why the historical background of the
"useful Arts" section of the Clause supports my suggested
reading. The fourth section explains how this interpretation
rationalizes the "Bargain Theory of Patents" assumed in the




Let us start by looking at the most constitutionally
relevant theory of property rights, the labor theory of John
Locke.9 Property is an important constitutional value. As
exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." U.S. CONST., art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8 ("the Intellectual Property Clause").
7. More correctly, "should be read to allow."
8. While this thesis has interesting ramifications for copyright disputes, I
leave that more complex issue for another article.
9. The Framers and ratiflers of the U.S. Constitution assumed a Lockian
conception of property. See, e.g., C. B. Macpherson, The Meaning of Property, in
PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND CRITICAL POSITIONS 1, 13 (ed. C. B. Macpherson,
1978). But see JOHN DUNN, THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF JOHN LOCKE: AN
HISTORICAL ACCOUNT OF THE ARGUMENT OF THE 'TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT' 7
& n.3 (Cambridge Univ. Press paperback reprint 1995) (claiming that "[tihe
story of how the Two Treatises of Government was causally responsible.., for
the direction of American political theory in the eighteenth century is... largely
false."); Peter Laslett, Introduction, to JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT 3, 14 & n.t (Cambridge Univ. Press Student Paperback ed. 1999
print) (arguing that Locke's influence on the American Revolution is generally
overrated; while Thomas Jefferson was a Lockian, not many of his
contemporaries were). This article, however, requires a property theory. The two
main philosophical theories of property in modem discussions are Locke's and
Hegel's. See, e.g., Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77
GEORGETOWN UNIV. L. J. 287 (1988) (discussing Locke and Hegel). Hegel's views,
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Jennifer Nedelsky demonstrates, the Federalists drafted a
constitution which undervalued individual, democratic
participation in government because they used private
property as the paradigm individual right to be protected by
the government against majoritarian faction. ° To understand
the constitutional limits, if any, on intellectual property," I
suggest we begin by trying to understand the background
concept of property assumed by the Constitution's drafters
and ratifiers. 12 Our first problem is deciding how to read
Locke. 3
Superficially, the Lockian position can be summarized
easily. Originally, man is situated in a state of nature14 where
however, were unavailable at the founding. See 7 FREDERICK COPLESTON, A
HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 159-62 (paperback ed. 1985) (providing a chronology of
Hegel's publications). Madison's most pertinent writing uses what I call a
Lockian public domain. See infra text accompanying note 67. I, therefore, focus
on Locke in this article;
10. See generally JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE MADISONIAN FRAMEwORK AND ITS LEGACY
(paperback ed. 1994).
[The Federalists' focus on protecting property from redistribution and,
more broadly, from democratic redefinition, led to a misunderstanding
of both the problems and the potential of democracy; and treating the
protection of unequal property as the paradigm case of the problem of
protecting individual rights in a democracy led to a misconception of
the complex relation between democracy and individual autonomy,
which is the true problem of constitutionalism. It was thus not property
as such, but the effort to protect property and inequality from
democratic revision, that has had distorting consequences.
Id. at 3 (stating her thesis).
11. Intellectual property is constitutionally different from other types of
property because Congress is empowered to create it.
12. We need to consider "original understanding" first, because the
Supreme Court commonly does. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758
(1999) ("We seek to discover, however, only what the Framers and those who
ratified the Constitution sought to accomplish .... ."). Second, we need to
consider it because learning from the past Is preferable repeating old errors. I
have not attempted to find out how any specific Framer or Ratifier of the
Constitution understood Locke's philosophy. Even accepting "original
understanding," such a quest overemphasizes the individual beliefs of specific
persons whose papers happen to be preserved, but whose papers may not have
been publicly influential during the ratification controversy. My preference,
furthermore, is to read the Constitution with careful attention to Its actual
wording, its amendments, ethical metavalues, and what the words must mean
for the current population of the United States to ratify the document.
13. Locke's ambiguity is notorious. See, e.g., DUNN, supra note 9, at 5-10.
14. "IT]he State that Nature hath provided." JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF
GOVERNMENT, 2ND TREATISE, § 27. But see Laslett, supra note 9, at 99 n. *
("Locke may be said to have done more than anyone else to found the study of
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all is owned in common, including the fruit on the trees. 5 To
survive, each man needs to be able to eat pieces of fruit
without individually asking permission of every other
person,6 i.e., without the problem of transaction costs. A man
who picks an apple obtains individual property in that apple
by virtue of the labor involved in picking it. 17 Each man owns
his own labor because he owns his own person. 8 Individual
appropriation does not harm anyone else because there are
as many fruits of equal quality available for every other
person to appropriate by also laboring.' 9 Because the earth
and its fruit are intended to sustain humans, no person may
waste fruit by picking so much that some rots.2° Some items,
however, are not highly perishable. A person does no wrong
by picking a pile of fruit and trading some of "his" or "her"
fruit for longer lasting items, such as nuts.2 Eventually men22
comparative anthropology, and he was well aware that the evidence did not
demonstrate a 'state of nature' of the sort he described in this political theory.").
15. "[Tihe Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men." IdA
16. "And will any one say he had no right to those Acorns or Apples he thus
appropriated, because he had not the consent of all Mankind to make them
his?... If such a consent as that was necessary, Man had starved,
notwithstanding the Plenty God had given him." Id § 28.
17. "When did [the picked apples or acorns] begin to be his?... And 'tis
plain, if the first gathering made them not his, nothing else could. That labor
put a distinction between them and common." Id.
18. "Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to all Men, yet
every Man has a Property in his own Person.... The Labor of his Body, and the
Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly his." Id. § 27.
19. Locke wrote:
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land, by improving it, any
prejudice to any other Man, since there was still enough, and as good
left; and more than the yet unprovided could use... For he that leaves




It will perhaps be objected to this, That if gathering the Acorns, or other
Fruits of the Earth [automatically] makes a right to them, then any one
may ingross as much as he will. To which I Answer, Not so. The same
Law of Nature, that does by this means give us Property, does also
bound that Property too. God has given us all things richly, (but only
to] enjoy. As much as any one can make use of to any advantage of life
before it spoils; so much he may by his labor fix a Property in. Whatever
is beyond this, is more than his share, and belongs to others. Nothing
was made by God for Man to spoil or destroy...
Id. § 31.
21. "And if he also bartered away Plumbs that would have rotted in a Week,
for Nuts that would last good for his eating a whole Year, he did no injury; he
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tacitly agreed to use non-perishable tokens, i.e., money, as a
substitute means of exchange.23 The use of money allows
some persons to obtain very large individual holdings without
unacceptable spoilage.2"
Let us look at a few rival interpretations of this
deceptively simple-sounding theory - not to understand
Locke's philosophy per se, but to understand the "property"
assumed by the Constitution.
A. The Limited Locke
John Dunn's Locke25 (whom I shall refer to as the
"Limited Locke") is, above all else, a seventeenth century
Calvinist26 with a limited, specific agenda: refuting Sir Robert
Filmer's claims of the security and symmetry of authority
wasted not the common Stock." Id. § 46.
22. Modem anti-discrimination conventions can only go so far. When God
created men, She was only joking, but Locke, the Founders, and their
contemporaries assumed She was only empowering the male of the species.
23. Locke wrote:
This is certain That in the beginning, before the desire of having more
than Men needed, had altered the intrinsick value of things, which
depends only on their usefulness to the Life of Man; or [Men] had
agreed, that a little piece of yellow Metal, which would keep without
wasting or decay, should be worth a great piece of Flesh, or a whole
heap of Corn; though Men had a Right to appropriate, by their Labor,
each one to himself, as much of the things of Nature, as he could use:
Yet this could not be much, nor to the Prejudice of others, where the
same plenty was still left, to those who would use the same Industry...
LOCKE, supra note 14, at § 37. "And thus came in the use of Money, some
lasting thing that Men might keep without spoiling, and that by mutual consent
Men would take in exchange for the truly useful, but perishable Supports of
Life." Id. § 47.
24. Locke wrote:
But since Gold and Silver, being little useful to the Life of Man in
proportion to Food, Rayment, and Carriage, has its value only from the
consent of Men, whereof Labor yet makes, in great part, the measure, it
is plain, that Men have agreed to disproportionate and unequal
Possession of the Earth, they having by a tacit and voluntary consent
found out a way, how a man may fairly posses more land than he
himself can use the product of, by receiving in exchange for the
overplus, Gold and Silver, which may be hoarded up without injury to
any one, these metalls not spoileing or decaying in the hands of the
possessor.
Id. § 50.
25. See DUNN, supra note 9.
26. See id. at 245-61. But see LASLETT, supra note 9, at 69 (Locke made use




Filmer, the Limited Locke's antagonist, argues that the
king holds preeminent ownership of all property in his
kingdom.28 Point one: God's creation of the world naturally
vested full ownership of the world in God. 29 Point two: God
gave the entire world to one man, Adam. Point three:
undivided ownership of each political territory has descended
from Adam to each sitting monarch.3' Political conclusion: the
king's underlying ownership authorizes his personal
entitlement to take back any desired item of property from
any subject at any time, i.e. unlimited power of taxation and
eminent domain without compensation.32 Locke accepts
Filmer's first two points, but disputes the third.33
27. See DUNN, supra note 9, at 72-73.
28. In English constitutional history, this position can be traced back at
least to John Cowell's The Interpreter, the pro-monarchial legal dictionary
banned by the House of Commons in 1610 during its dispute with James I. See,
e.g., G. E. Aylmer, The Meaning and Definition of "Property" in Seventeenth
Century England, 86 PAST & PRESENT 87, 88-89 (1980) (discussing briefly and
listing other sources); William E. Klein, Parliament, Liberty and the Continent in
the Early Seventeenth Century: The Perception, 6 PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 209,
211 (1987) (same); see also A Proclamation touching J. Cowell's book called the
Interpreter (25 March 1610), reprinted in 1 STUART ROYAL PROCLAMATIONS 243
(James F. Larkin and Paul L. Hughes, eds., 1973) (suppressing book). The
Interpreter, however, did not stay suppressed. Ten editions were printed by
1728 when it was superseded by Jacob's Law Dictionary. See id. at 244 n. 2
(note by editors).
Propertie signifleth the highest right that a man hath or can have to any
thing; which is in no way depending upon any other mans courtesie.
And this none in our kingdom can be said to have in any lands, or
tenements, but onely the king in the right of his Crowne. Because all
the lands through the realme, are in the nature of fee, and doe hould
either mediately or immediately of the Crowne. See Fee. This word
neuerthelesse is in our common law, used for that right in lands and
tenements, that common persons have, because it importeth as much
as (utile dominium) though not (directum).
JOHN COWELL, THE INTERPRETER (unnumbered page) (1970 Da Capo Press




32. See Robert Filmer, Patriarchia, in PATRIARCHIA AND OTHER WRITINGS 1-68
(Johann P. Sommerville ed., Camb. Univ. Press 1991); Dunn, supra note 9, at
58-76 (discussing Filmer's positions).
33. Locke wrote:
I will not content my self to answer, That if it be difficult to make out
Property, upon a supposition, that God gave the World to Adam and his
Posterity in common; it is impossible that any Man, but one universal
Monarch. should have any Property, upon a supposition, that God gave
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While the Limited Locke begins with man in the state of
nature, this state of nature is a theological construct, not a
historical or psychological description; the state of nature is
man's position outside history34 as a creation of God. Even in
the state of nature, man is obligated by his position as God's
creation.
The Limited Locke's project is limited; he wants to prove
that non-monarchial property is protected by more than mere
convention. The enemy is non-parliamentary taxation and
confiscation of freeholds, not a welfare policy of egalitarian
wealth redistribution. 36 The Limited Locke has never seen, nor
conceived of, any society without unequal property. He is not
trying to justify inequality, but we have no evidence that he
finds inequality offensive. Labor is central because each
man's definitive moral duty is to work at the particular
"calling" given him by God. 8 The prohibition against 'waste"
is also theological. God is both benign and efficient: all He
created was created for a purpose; man sins if he uses
anything in contradiction to divine purposes.39 The Limited
Locke seems to mean the anti-waste provision literally; he
simply ignores the tension between the "as much and as
good" proviso and major inequalities in wealth in post-
monetary society.
the World to Adam, and his Heirs in Succession, exclusive of all the rest
of his Posterity.
LOCKE, supra note 14, at § 25.
34. See generally J. G. A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT (Princeton
Univ. Press paperback ed., 1975) (describing development of theory of history);
id. at 3-9 (explaining the central premise of the book to be how western man
developed the concept of "history" to replace the ancient Greek prioritizing of
the unchanging and the medieval prioritizing of the apocalyptic).
35. See DUNN, supra note 9, at 97-98. Locke starts here because his
opponent, Filmer, starts with the Creation, thus trumping the standard
"historical" Whig arguments from the Ancient Constitution. See id. at 101. The
existing version of Two Treatises does not discuss the English history
arguments Filmer made elsewhere. A large part of Locke's original manuscript,
however, was lost before the first printing. The "lost" manuscript may have been
destroyed to protect Locke from punishment for treason, as a discussion of the
ancient constitution would have been politically dangerous before the Glorious
Revolution. See LASLE-r, supra note 9, at 76-78 (raising and discounting this
possibility).
36. See id. at 216; see also LASLE'rT, supra note 9 at 107 (Locke's property
theory is not fully developed because his only aim was to delegitimize taxation).
37. See DUNN, supra note 9, at 240.
38. See id. at 218-25.
39. See id. at 95.
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This Limited Locke is a convincing historical figure, but
he does not answer my questions about the public domain.
He would be sufficient, however, to support the Founders'
slogan "[t]axation without representation is tyranny."
40
B. The Proletarian Locke
Locke can be read as a forerunner of Marx41 in his
emphasis of the claim of individual self-ownership:
Though the Earth, and all inferior Creatures be common to
all Men, yet every Man has a Property in his own Person.
This no Body has any Right to but himself. The Labor of his
Bodh., and the Work of his Hands, we may say, are properly
his.
If no person can own another person's labor, Locke
supports Marx: working people are entitled to the value their
labor adds to the raw materials worked upon, not the
squeezed-down market value after the capitalist has
appropriated all the surplus.43 In terms of land, Locke says
ownership is justified by the labor which makes land more
productive. 4 So why, as Proudhon famously asks, does the
40. A DICTIONARY OF LEGAL QUOTATIONS 166 (Simon James & Chantal
Stebbings eds., 1987) (ascribed to James Otis); see also TOM PAINE, RIGHTS OF
MAN, reprinted in TOM PAINE, THE SELECTED WORKS OF TOM PAINE & CITIZEN PAINE
96, 100 (Thomas Field, ed., Modem Library ed. 1946) ("In England it is said
that money cannot be taken out of the pockets of the people without their
consent.").
41. See, e.g., C. H. Driver, John Locke, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF
SOME ENGLISH THINKERS OF THE AUGUSTAN AGE 69, 91 (F. J. C. Hearnshaw ed.,
1967 facsimile reprint of 1928 ed.) (suggesting that Locke's labor theory of
property led to Karl Marx.).
42. LOCKE, supra note 14, at § 27 (emphasis added).
43. See I KARL MARX, CAPITAL, reprinted in PROPERTY: MAINSTREAM AND
CRITICAL POSITIONS 64, 76 (C. B. Macpherson ed. 1978).
Political economy confuses on principle two very different kinds of
property, of which one rests on the producers' own labor, the other on
the employment of the labor of others. It forgets that the latter not only
is the direct antithesis of the former, but absolutely grows on its tomb
only.
See id. See also PIERRE-JOSEPH PROUDHON, WHAT IS PROPERTY? 88 (Donald R.
Kelley & Bonnie G. Smith ed. & trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1994) ("Here is
my proposition: The laborer retains, even after receiving his wages, a natural
right of property in the thing which he has produced. "),
44. Locke wrote:
But the chief matter of Property being now not the Fruits of the Earth,
and the Beasts that subsist on it, but the Earth it self; as that which
takes in and carries with it all the rest: I think it is plain, that Property
in that too is acquired as the former. As much Land as a Man Tills,
Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the Product of, so much is
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first worker hold the land in perpetuity? Why does
government force later tillers and improvers to settle for bare
subsistence wages paid by the idle decedents of the original
tillers?45 The "as much and as good" proviso, furthermore,
could support the proposition that each member of each
generation is entitled to an equal opportunity to the
commons.
No one, however, seemingly suggests that the John Locke
of seventeenth century England proposed any major social
upheaval. The "egalitarians" roughly contemporary with
Locke were the Levelers. They went no further than asking for
a change in the property test for the franchise; they wanted
the vote extended to all adult males who were neither wage
laborers, criminals, nor alms takers.46 The 1787 United States
Constitution is not a socialist tract; the Federalist position, in
part at least, was a negative reaction to debtor relief laws.47
C. The Acquisitive Locke
C. B. Macpherson posits an Acquisitive Locke, an
apologist for unlimited private appropriation, an almost
perfect spokesperson for the accumulation of capital for
investment. The Acquisitive Locke, per Macpherson, is
providing a justification for the unlimited, individual
accumulation of property in land and money for use as
capital in a market economy.48 Macpherson's most important
his Property. He by his Labor does, as it were, inclose it from the
Common.
LOCKE, supra note 14, § 32.
45. See PROUDHON, supra note 43, at 86-90. Cf. William Patry, The Failure of
the American Copyright System: Protecting the Idle Rich, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
907 (1997) (arguing that extensions of the copyright term are not congruent
with the constitutional policy of rewarding and encouraging intellectual labor;
extensions reward the "idle rich").
46. See [Levelers'] Petition of January 1648, reprinted in C. B. MACPHERSON,
THE POLITIcAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM: HOBBES TO LOCKE 124
(Oxford Univ. Press paperback ed. 1964); see generally id. at 107-59 (discussing
Leveler movement). Tully reads Locke's position as implicitly going further: each
man has property in himself, property is the traditional, English basis of the
franchise; therefore, every man is entitled to the franchise. Locke did not,
however, expressly make this argument. See JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON
PROPERTY: JOHN LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES 173-74 (1980).
47. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 1 (prohibiting states from making
paper money legal tender); NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 147-49.
48. See MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 107 ("Locke saw money as not
merely a medium of exchange but as capital.... [Capital is acquired] to beget
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moves are to read both the spoilage and the "as much and as
good" provisos completely out of monetized society. He also
deletes any limitation on acquiring property through others'
labor. Macpherson's view of the spoilage limitation is clearly
supported by the text. His other arguments, however, are
questionable. His final conclusion is, I believe, extremely
anachronistic - which may not defeat it as a suggestion for
learning from Locke's philosophical works, but probably
disqualifies it as a sensible backdrop to the 1787
Constitution.
Macpherson defuses the Proletarian Locke by focusing on
the following passage:
Thus the Grass that my Horse has bit; the Turfs my Servant
has cut, and the Ore I have digg'd in any place where I have
a right to them in common with others, become my
Property, without the assignation or consent of any body.
The labor that was mine, removing them out of that
common state they were in, hath fixed my Property in
them.49
To Macpherson, this passage asserts that the employer
owns the labor of his paid human servant in the same way
that he owns the actions of his horse. Locke's text, however,
is barren of discussion. Locke denied that the human right in
one's self included the right to commit suicide; self ownership
does not go that far.50 Locke, however, does not set the exact
boundary of self-ownership. Macpherson notes this tension
between capitalist, economic and traditional Christian values,
but merely reiterates that Locke mentions no problem.5 1 To a
reader with a legal eye, the phrase, "the Turfs my Servant has
cut," seems analogous to over-stated dicta. Locke developed
the personal labor theory of property too extensively for such
a throw-away line to disestablish the theory's ramifications -
even if the author has overlooked one of them. Rousseau's
Discourse on Inequality, furthermore, was published in
1755;52 ratifiers of the 1787 Constitution and its first ten
further capital by profitable investment."). But see TULLY, supra note 46, at 149
(explaining the anachronistic nature of reading "capital accumulation" into
Locke).
49. LOCKE, supra note 14, § 28 (emphasis added); see MACPHERSON,
supra note 46, at 214-20 (discussing § 28).
50. LOCKE, supra note 14, § 135.
51. See MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 219-20.
52. Jean-Jacques Rousseau was "catapulted into the public eye" by his two
discourses. The Second Discourse was written for the 1753 essay competition of
2000] THE OWNED PUBLIC DOMAIN
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amendments may have noticed this tension in Locke's text.53
Macpherson is even less convincing about the "as much
and as good" proviso, which he declares was trumped by the
tacit consent to use money. Macpherson reads Locke's
chronology as: (a) state of nature with exchange by barter of
useful goods where possessions are limited by two provisos;
(b) state of nature with money; money bypasses spoilage and
accumulation is unlimited by "as much and as good" proviso;
and finally, (c) organized society subject to conventional
property rules promulgated by governments. 54 Macpherson's
chronology relies on the italicized language in the following
passage:
This partage of things, in an inequality of private
possessions, men have made practicable out of the bounds
of Societie, and without compact, only by putting a value on
gold and silver and tacitly agreeing in the use of Money. For
in Governments the Laws regulate the right of property,
and the possession of land is determined by positive
constitutions.5
Macpherson's reading is possible, but seems to ignore (i)
the use of "For" to begin the second quoted sentence; (ii) the
possible meaning of "out of the bounds of Societie" here as
merely "without express compacts creating formal
the Dijon Academy on the set topic "What is the source of inequality among
men and is it authorized by natural law?" See id. at 18. Rousseau's entry "firmly
established Rousseau as a thinker to be reckoned with." Id. at 4-5. The work
was published in 1755 in Geneva. See JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, DISCOURSE ON
THE ORIGIN AND FOUNDATIONS OF INEQUALITY AMONG MEN, reprinted in THE FIRST
AND SECOND DISCOURSES 77, 77 (Roger D. Masters ed., St. Martin's Press
paperback ed. 1964) (reproduction of original title page). Rousseau considered
man to be social, happy, and equal in the state of nature. Inequality, war, and
oppression were creations of society. Id. at 101-02, 140-42, 151-52, 180-81.
53. Macpherson's reading overlooks Locke's distinction between "slaves,"
who are forced to work (an action Locke condemns), and "servants." See LOCKE,
supra note 14, § 85; JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, 1ST TREATISE,
§ 42 [hereinafter 1st Treatise]. But see LASLETT, supra note 9, at 105-06
(asserting that section 130 of the First Treatise shows that slavery "in no way
perturbs" Locke; I consider this an extreme over reading of section 130, which
merely answers Filmer's patriarchal construction of a specific biblical story).
Tully further defuses the servant problem by asserting that Locke is assuming a
seventeenth century model of the servant hired for specific service, a model
allegedly replaced by "capitalist" wage-labor only in the "late eighteenth
century." TULLY, supra note 46, at 136-44. The alleged point of change,
however, is too close to 1791 to comfort someone interested in how the
Founders' generation read Locke.
54. See MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 210-11.
55. See LOCKE, supra note 14, § 50 (emphasis added).
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governments," and (iii) the atemporal nature of Locke's state
of nature. The claim. in Locke's text, that inequality of
possession is logically separable from the existence of formal
governments, seems a weak support for removing the main
proviso Locke uses to legitimize private property, especially as
the historical Locke's agenda was a dispute between the
monarch and the rest of society en masse.
Macpherson's other support is logically fallacious.
Macpherson reads the "as much and as good" proviso as
equivalent to the natural (and God given) right to use the
fruits of the earth for personal subsistence. Since cultivated
land produces much more than uncultivated land, persons
who cultivate it may equitably keep most of it; all the paid
laborer is entitled to is the bare subsistence available from
unimproved land, the type of land available "in the beginning"
of the state of nature. 6 Macpherson's argument is not
convincing because Locke's "enough and as good limitation"
is not based solely on the right of sufficiency; it is required
because all humans have the right to appropriate from the
common through labor:
Nor was this appropriation of any parcel of Land, by
improving it, any prejudice to any other Man, since there
was still enough, and as good left; and more than the yet
unprovided could use. So that in effect, there was never the
less left for others because of his inclosure for himself. For
he that leaves as much as another can make use of, does
as good as take nothing at all. No Body could think himself
injur'd by the drinking of another Man, though he took a
good Draught, who had a whole River of the same Water left
him to quench his thirst. And the Case of Land and Water,
where there is enough of both, is perfectly the same.57
Nature/God, however, gave man the world, not just for
"the Support," but also for "the Comfort" of men's] being; "to
make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and
convenience."58 Historically, furthermore, the labor that
rendered the improved land more productive seems largely
the labor of the non-landowning class.
Macpherson correctly points out the upper-class
seventeenth century's standard assumptions that poor
persons are not full members of society, lack complete
56. See MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 211-14.
57. LOCKE, supra note 14, § 33.
58. Id. § 26.
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rationality, are not entitled to political power, and survive on
a bare subsistence. He correctly points to the Protestant
ethic's occasional conflation of money and merit.59 These
uncontested points, however, merely show why Locke may
have been unaware of the tensions we see inside his
explication. 60 The platitudinous nature of Locke's "errors"
supports no more than the Limited Locke.61 It provides no
reason for Americans in the late eighteenth century not to
notice Locke's internal tensions. Whatever the Federalists
who drafted the 1787 Constitution personally believed about
a natural aristocracy, the equality rhetoric of the documents
they published eroded the popular notion of the quality's
61importance.
D. The Located Locke
I recommend the Located Locke explicated by James
Tully.63 Tully places Locke in linguistic, philosophical, and
historical sequence. The Located Locke preexisted our
assumed dichotomy between "private" and "common"
property,64 as well as our assumed dichotomy between
"property" and "rights."65 Locke's terms, furthermore, grow
from technical distinctions of Roman law, distinctions with
which we are no longer familiar.66 To understand the founding
59. See MACPHERSON, supra note 46, at 221-32.
60. As Macpherson points out, Locke argues on the contrary assumptions
that pre-social men are rational and that pre-social men are irrationally
quarrelsome. Id. at 238-46.
61. As Laslett agrees:
Locke is, perhaps, the least consistent of all the great philosophers, and
pointing out the contradictions either within any of his works or
between them is not a difficult task. Sometimes it seems quite clear
that he was unconscious of his inconsistency, at other times ... he
himself realized his dilemma, but was unable to find a solution.
LASLETr, supra note 9, at 82.
62. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE RADICALISM OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 172-77 (Vintage Books paperback ed. 1993); see also id. at 184
("With the post-revolution republican culture talking of nothing but liberty,
equality, and independence, even hired servants eventually became hard to
control.").
63. See TULLY, supra note 46.
64. See, e.g., id. at x.
65. See, e.g., id. at 7.
66. See, e.g., id. at xiil-xiv. Some of these linguistic distinctions were
purposely jettisoned by a few natural law writers who shortly predated Locke,
thus adding to the difficulty of clearly expressing certain arguments. See id. at
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generation's "property," we need to understand Locke's
references for his terms; 1787 is linguistically closer to Locke
than 2000 is.
The linguistic tie between Locke and the Founders is
evident, for example, in Madison's often quoted essay
Property. Madison shares Locke's view of property as
encompassing natural rights.
In its larger and juster meaning, [property] embraces every
thing to which a man may attach a value and have a right;
and which leaves to everyone else the like advantage.
... a man's land, or merchandize, or money is called his
property.
... a man has a property in his opinions and the free
communication of them.
6 7
This Madisonian statement also shadows Locke by
defining "property" as "leav[ing] to everyone else the like
advantage," an echo of the main Lockian proviso and, as
discussed below, of central importance to the Located Locke.
Let us, therefore, explicate the Located Locke.
The Located Locke begins with the Christian and natural
law assumptions that man's proper behavior and moral limits
are teleologically bound. While reaching heaven is one
goal/purpose of mankind, another is sustaining the physical
welfare of all mankind in this world.' Both the respect for
68-77 ("Grotius has divested himself of the terminology in which he could
discuss [traditional natural law and Lockian] common property." Pufendorf
followed Grotius' lead.).
67. JAMES MADISON, Property, 29 Mar. 1792, reprinted in I THE FOUNDERS'
CONSTITUTION 598-99 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., University of
Chicago Press 1987) (original emphasis deleted). At least one scholar has
asserted this publication was "extraordinary" and "virtually unprecedented."
See MICHAEL KAMMEN, The Rights of Property, and the Property in Rights,
reprinted in LIBERTY, PROPERTY AND THE FOUNDATION OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 1, 11 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman eds., 1989); see also
NEDELSKY, supra note 10, at 21-22 (labeling this usage of "property" to include
rights "atypical" in Madison's writings). Similar positions, however, seem to
have been advanced in England by the mid-seventeenth century, see, e.g., Alan
Craig Houston, "A Way of Settlement": The Levelers, Monopolies and the Public
Interest, 14 HIsT. OF POL. THOUGHT 381 (1993) (describing similar concepts as
common background in England around 1640 and asserting that on these
points the Levelers' uniqueness dealt only in the use of "monopoly" analogies),
and were commonly used by the ratifying generation. See John 0. McGinnis,
The Once and Future Property-Based Vision of the First Amendment, 63 U. CHI.
L. REv. 49 (1996) (arguing that Madison saw free speech as property, but
proving that Madison, and other Founders, predated the modem
rights/property dichotomy).
68. See TULLY, supra note 46, at 175-76.
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God's creations and the natural right of sustenance
individually prove69 that the world was originally owned in
common by all mankind. ° As with the Limited Locke, this
"originally" is not historical; "origin" or "cause" in the Located
Locke refers to teleological causation.7 '
The Located Locke's "property" is a wide term including
rights.72 Locke's use is neither confused nor ambiguous. He
expressly defines a property claim as a claim to inclusion; "x
owns y" means that x has a right not to be excluded from the
use of y;7 13 the phrase includes, but is not limited to,
situations where x can exclude all others from y. ' Locke does
not see the right to exclude others as the central stick in a
bundle of property rights. Locke's common ownership,
furthermore, is not equivalent to the usage we have inherited
from Grotius and Pufendorf; these natural law philosophers
held that the world was "common" in the sense that no
individual had a right to exclude others - an unowned public
domain. Their usage was, however, a collapse of distinctions
made by earlier natural law philosophers. Locke uses the
older meaning. To Locke, "common" requires two elements: (i)
no individual has a right to exclude all others; and (ii) each
member of the commonality has a claim right to be included
in the common - a right not to be excluded.7 5 This is the
ownership right that I claim for all in the public domain.
A corresponding difference results in the definition of
"justice." In a world of unowned commons, justice is rendered
when each man receives his own. In a world of owned
commons, justice also requires that each man receive his
69. Locke agrees with the basic assumption of St. Thomas Aquinas that
natural law and Revelation reach the same conclusions. See id. at 68.
70. See LOCKE, supra note 14, §§ 25, 26; TULLY, supra note 46, at 60.
71. SeeTULLY, supranote 46, at 19-22 (explaining that in Locke's
"workmanship" theory of understanding, something's "cause" is its essence or
.cause of being.").
72. See id. at 112-16.
73. Property is something "Itihe nature whereof is, that without a Man's own
consent it cannot be taken from him." LOCKE, supra note 14, § 193. As Tully
explains, this definition removes the need to discuss a wider and a narrower
sense of "property." SeeTULLY, supranote 46, at 110. But seeLASLETT,
supra note 9, at 100-03 (asserting that Locke has at least two different
definitions of "property"); see also Madison, supra quoted text accompanying
note 67 (discussing narrower and wider definitions of "property").
74. See TULLY, supra note 46, at 114-16; LOCKE, supra note 14, § 173.
75. See TULLY, supra note 46, at 68-91.
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due, i.e. that to which he is entitled to fulfill his "function" or
"purpose" - including a sufficiency of things necessary for
preservation. 6  Consider Tully's analogy to public
transportation. Every person who pays the fare (labors) has
the right to get on the bus which is held in common by the
community. If a common is an absence of the right to
exclude, once all benches are occupied, the next person
boarding may not enter. If a common is a right not to be
excluded, the next person may require earlier passengers to
put their baggage on the floor or to move closer together so
that he can board."
The Located Locke argues that, in the state of nature,
mankind shared the commons without governments by
following two provisos: no waste, and leave enough and as
good for everyone else. Each person acquired a "use right" in
the products and improved land7 1 produced by that person's
labor exerted on natural land and material - a model of
ownership close to English sixteenth century land law.
79
76. See id. at 84-85. Currently, I am not disputing the ruling interpretation
of the United States Constitution as providing only negative rights against the
government. See e.g., Frank Michelman, Tutelary Jurisprudence and
Constitutional Jurisprudence, in LIBERTY, PROPERTY, AND THE FUTURE OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 127 (Ellen Frankel Paul & Howard Dickman, eds.
1990 paperback ed.) (discussing property's place in the dispute over negative
and positive constitutional rights). I acknowledge that the negative rights
Constitution is inconsistent with this aspect of Locke. This article makes a
much narrower argument about the relevance of Locke's position to one clause
in the Constitution, the Intellectual Property Clause.
77. See TULLY, supra note 46, at 67-68.
78. Locke accepted Francis Bacon's theory that when an agent worked on
some res, that agent transformed the res into some new entity. See TULLY,
supra note 46, at 117. This (to me incredible) theory allowed Locke to bypass
our enormous problem of quantifying the amount of ownership rightfully
acquired for some quantum of labor added to a preexisting substratum. We
have to answer Nozick's question: if a man pours a glass of tomato Juice into
the ocean, does the man lose his tomato juice or does he acquire the ocean? See
ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 174-75 (1974).
79. See TULLY, supra note 46, at 125-30. In many situations, common
ownership (in Locke's sense) has proven viable. See, e.g., CARL JOHAN DAHLAM,
THE OPEN FIELD SYSTEM AND BEYOND: A PROPERTY RIGHTS ANALYSIS OF AN
ECONOMIC INSTITUTION 86-141 (1980) (providing economic justification of
medieval open field system of agriculture); HENRY SUMNER MAIN, VILLAGE-
COMMUNMES IN THE EAST AND WEST (London, John Murray 1871) (discussing
several common ownership systems); ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING THE COMMONS
(Cambridge Univ. Press 1990) (same); Carol Rose, The Comedy of the Commons:
Custom, Commerce, and Inherently Public Property, 53 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 711,
711 (1986) (same). If modem economic theory "proves" that commons are
"always" tragic, fact shows the limitations of the theory. Zeno, similarly,
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Tully's next important analytical concern is money. The
state of nature functions without government or strife
because each person takes only what he actually uses. Every
person who labors, therefore, can obtain use rights enough
for both sustenance and convenience. Money, however,
introduces evil into the world; men start desiring things
merely to hoard them. Hoarding is an unnatural, immoral
action. When hoarding starts, hoarders no longer leave as
much and as good for others. Therefore, since the natural
system has broken down, men must institute governments. 0
Under governments, property rights are entirely conventional.
A man owns whatever the govemment-instituted ownership
rules support. The government has wide discretion in setting
up specific property rules, but is still limited by (a) the justice
rule not to take from someone any property acquired under
the government-created conventional rules, and (b) the
functional, natural requirement that society ensure a
sufficiency of material needs to each person.81 If any
government breaks these rules, the people have a right of
revolt.82
The Located Locke, therefore, is not justifying any
specific, conventional property system, not even the then-
current English ownership system.83 The Located Locke is not
justifying major inequalities of wealth,84 the invisible hand's
beneficence," or the motive of narrow self interest leading to
acquisitiveness.86  Property remains tied to function
throughout; property's function is not individualistic;
property's function is to provide sustenance and convenience
to all humankind, who are equal in having rights. 87 The
"proved" to pre-calculus mathematicians that Achilles could not overtake a
tortoise. See 7 COPLESTON, supra note 9, at 56-58 (discussing Zeno of Elea's
paradoxes on motion).
80. See LOCKE, supra note 14, §§ 37, 47-50.
81. The required inclusion, however, is now limited to each separate nation.
Common rights no longer exist as to the whole world. See id. § 45.
82. See id. §§ 135, 145 (supporting the last two propositions); see also
TULLY, supra note 46, at 145-67 (supporting entire paragraph in text).
83. See TULLY, supra note 46, at 100.
84. See id. at 101-02, 163.
85. See id. at 149, 161 (asserting that concepts of an economic sphere
separate from the political and of a self-regulating market were simply absent
from 17th century English thought).
86. See td. at 103-04.
87. See LOCKE, supra note 14, § 5; see TULLY, supra note 46, at 99.
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echoes in the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution are unmistakable.
II
A Lockian Reading of the Intellectual Property
Clause
We cannot interpret the Intellectual Property Clause with
only the minimal existing documentation of the 1787
Constitutional Convention and the ratifying controversies."
We are, therefore, left with the words themselves.
Assuming that the Founders' generation read the
Intellectual Property Clause against the doctrines of Locke,
the only Locke who reaches our issue is the Located Locke.
Let us, therefore, ask what the words of the clause mean if
read against the property theory of Locke (Located).
Congress shall have the power ... To promote the progress
of science and useful arts, by securing for limited times to
authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective
writings and discoveries.
89
Congress is given a power to "secure" rights to certain
individuals. To the extent that such powers are equivalent to
"patents in inventions," this rejects the English location of the
power with the monarch (the executive). 90
Authors' and Inventors' rights to exclude do not exist
without optional Congressional action. Congress has the
power, but is not required to act. "Secure" could be read to
imply that authors and inventors already have such rights;
Congress is merely empowered to make these pre-existing
rights safe.9 The Supreme Court, correctly, has refused this
88. See, e.g., Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power or Over-Priced Free
Lunch: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the
Public's Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2000);
<http//www.fcsl.edu/
purveyance.310.2000.htm> (providing detailed discussion).
89. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
90. See e.g., Pollack, supra note 88, passim (discussing the relationship
between English patent law and the Intellectual Property Clause); see also, e.g.,
I WILLIAM CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE
UNITED STATES 486-87 (1953) (discussing relocation of patent power).
91. A committee of the Continental Congress created by the Articles of
Confederation suggested that the individual states enact copyright legislation.
The committee's report does use language arguably supporting a natural rights
position "being persuaded that nothing is more properly a man's own than the
fruit of his study." 24 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 326-27 (1922).
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reading. 92 Dictionaries treat the word 'secure' as ambiguous
on the issue of the object's pre-existence of the action.93 The
This argument is unconvincing, because the Constitution's language is carefully
different. We have no reason to believe that all ratifiers, or even all highly
educated colonials, accepted the natural rights theory of patent or copyright.
See, e.g., Graham v. John Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 7- 10 (1966) (reviewing some
documentary evidence of Thomas Jefferson's disagreement with natural rights
claim).
92, See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, 661 (1834; mem.) ("IThe word
.secure," as used in the Constitution, could not mean the protection of an
acknowledged legal right. It refers to inventors, as well as authors, and it has
never been pretended . .. that an inventor has a perpetual right, at common
law, to sell the thing invented."). The same error on English patent law
demonstrates that Madison's statement in the Federalist Papers about the
Intellectual Property Clause was too unconsidered to be taken very seriously:
The utility of this power will scarcely be questioned. The copyright of
authors has been solemnly adjudged, in Great Britain, to be a right of
common law. The right to useful inventions seems with equal reason to
belong to the inventors. The public good fully coincides with the claims
of individuals. The States cannot separately make effectual provision for
either of the cases, and most of them have anticipated the decision of
this point, by laws passed at the instances of Congress.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 43, at 279 (John Madison) (Modem Library ed., 1937). As
for copyright, Madison may have been misled because his available Blackstone
was printed before the outcome in Donaldson v. Beckett. See John F. Whicher,
The Ghost of Donaldson v. Beckett: An Inquiry into the Constitutional Distribution
of Powers Over the Law of Intellectual Property in the United States, Part L 9
BULL. COPYRIGHT SOC'Y U.S.A. 102, 133 (1961) (Framers had access only to
Blackstone's 4th ed. which was published before Donaldson.). That edition,
however, was not as positive as the Federalist:
In the case of Miller v. Taylor... it was determined (upon solemn
argument and great consideration) by the opinion of three judges
against one, that an exclusive copyright in authors subsists by the
common law. But a writ of error hath been since brought in the
exchequer chamber, to take the sense of the rest of the judges upon
this nice and important question.
2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *407-07. Patterson denies the existence
of an author's common law copyright in pre-1709 England. See LYMAN RAY
PATTERSON, COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 150 (1968). But see 6 WILLIAM
SEARLE HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 379 (1956) ("But it can hardly
be doubted that the view taken by the majority of the judges, both in [Jeffreys v.
Boosey, 4 H.L.C. 815 (1954)) and in [Miller v. Taylor, 4 Burr. 2303 (1769), and
Donaldson v. Beckett, 4 Burr. 2408 (1774)] that [copyright] existed at common
law, is historically correct." even though "there are hardly any common law
actions for infringement of copyright before the Act of 1709"; the absence of
common law cases caused by the existence of better remedies elsewhere.). I do
not accept Holdsworth's claim that a right existed at common law in the
absence of any decisions, statutes, etc. enforcing or decreeing that right.
93. Following the practice of Chief Justice Rehnquist, Wallace v. Jaffree,
472 U.S. 38, 106 (1985) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting), I consulted the first
American dictionary. The transitive verb "secure" has seven entries:
1. To guard effectually from danger; to make safe...
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pre-existence reading stumbles, furthermore, on' the
Convention's decision that a power was needed, as well as on
its choice not to require congressional action.94
The rights Congress has the power to issue are to be
"exclusive." Presumably, this means allowing authors and
inventors the right to exclude others. 95
The rights are to be given to "authors" and "inventors" in
"writings" and "discoveries." The Supreme Court has relied on
this language to require minimum creativity for a copyright.
96
The clause does not limit congressional power to pre-existing
legal entities known as "patents" and "copyrights." Using the
terminology "Authors' Exclusive Rights" ("AERs") and
"Inventors' Exclusive Rights" ("IERs") allows us to distinguish
the constitutionally allowed entities from whatever
entitlements Congress chooses to legislate.9"
The rights are not to be permanent, but for "limited
2. To make certain; to put beyond hazard....
3. To inclose or confine effectively; to guard effectually from escape;
sometimes to seize and confine...
4. To make certain of payment...
5. To make certain of receiving a precarious debt by giving bond,
bail...
6. To insure, as property.
7. To make fast; as to secure a door...
NOAH WEBSTER, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE n.p. (facsimile
10th ed. 1998) (1823). Johnson's dictionary lists first "To make certain; to put
out of hazard; to ascertain." The examples under this definition include many
where the object secured does not yet exist, one from John Locke: "Actions have
their preference, not according to the transient pleasure or pain that
accompanies or follow them here, but as they serve to secure that perfect
durable happiness hereafter." 2 SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH
LANGUAGE 1732 (reprint ed. Librairie Du Liban 1978) (4th ed. 1773).
94. Compare "Each House shall keep a journal of its proceedings..." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 3.
95. Webster gives three meanings for the adjective "exclusive:" (I) "Having
the power of preventing entrance," (ii) "Debarring from participation; possessed
and enjoyed to the exclusion of others; as an exclusive privilege," and (iii) "not
taking into the account". . . "as the general had five thousand troops, exclusive
of artillery." WEBSTER, supra note 93, at n.p. Johnson lists these three in the
same order and adds a fourth, "excepting." See 1 JOHNSON, supra note 93, at
682.
96. See Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv., 499 U.S. 340, 346 (1991)
("In two decisions ... this Court defined the crucial terms, 'authors' and
'writings'.... these terms presuppose a degree of originality.").
97. See Malla Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability?, 18 SEATrLE U. L.
REV. 259, 290-91 (1995).
times." The Supreme Court agrees.98
Congress' power is. constrained by the preliminary
phrase, "to Promote the Progress of Science and the Useful
Arts." The Supreme Court considers this limitation to be
integral to the requirements that materials protected by
patent and copyright statutes must meet minimal
requirements.99 The Constitution commonly mentions rights
in order to assign limits. 00 The Court is loathe to label any
words in the Constitution "mere surplusage."' °
The Court has yet to explain what these textual limits
imply about the public domain. I suggest that the Clause
invokes the Public Domain as a Lockian common: a domain
from which each individual has the right not to be excluded.
First, why does the Clause state that Congress may give
certain individuals "exclusive rights"? The phrasing is odd
unless the default position, the status if Congress chooses
not to act, is that no one may be excluded.
Second, what is Congress required to promote with these
rights to exclude? Answer: "the Progress of Science and the
Useful Arts.""°2 The Court has consistently read this to mean
98. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
146 (1989) ("Congress may not create patent monopolies of unlimited
duration."); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975)
("the limited copyright duration required by the Constitution"); Pennock v.
Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1829) (Constitution "contemplates... that this
exclusive right shall exist but for a limited time."); see generally Pollack,
Unconstitutional Incontestability, supra note 97, at 274-87 (discussing at length
the meaning of "limited times" in the Intellectual Property Clause).
99. See, e.g., Felst, 499 U.S. at 349 (stating that facts may not be protected
by copyright because "[tihe primary objective of copyright is... 'to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts'"); Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6
(1966) ("Innovation, advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful
knowledge are inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional
command must 'promote the Progress of... useful Arts.'").
100. See 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 90, at 486-87. See also Railway Labor
Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471 (1982) (Congress may not
bypass the "uniformity" requirement in the Bankruptcy Clause by appealing to
the Commerce Clause).
101. See Carter v. United States, 120 S. Ct. 2159, 2165 (2000) (rejecting
proffered reading of statute because "extra clauses in subsection (b) 'cannot be
regarded as mere surplusage'") (quoting Potter v. United States, 155 U.S. 438,
446 (1894)). Some scholars, however, argue that the Framers neither said what
they meant, nor meant what they said. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINAL INTENT
AND THE FRAMERS' CONSTITUTION 179 (1988) (discussing the First Amendment).
102. This phrase deserves much more clarification, but I leave that to
another article.
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that the purpose of the exclusive rights granted is to move
"inventions" and "writings" into a sphere where all may use
them, the public domain."3
Third, why is the Clause phrased as a limit on Congress?
Congress is limited because the default position is a right of
the people - the right not to be excluded. The Constitution is
a document protecting the people from government.
None of these textual points require that the public
domain be a Lockian owned common in which each
individual has a claim right not to be excluded, as contrasted
to a Grotian unowned common in which material is merely
unacquired. Alternatively, the power not granted Congress
might have been assumed reserved to the states."° However,
it seems that a Lockian common is the interpretation which
least strains the text.
History, furthermore, supplies several reasons for
empowering a Lockian common.1
0 5
II
Inventors' Exclusive Rights and the Lockian
Common
The Inventors' right in the Intellectual Property Clause is
a descendant 6 of the 1624 Statute of Monopolies. 7 The
103. See, e.g., Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 151 ("[Tthe ultimate goal of the
patent system is to bring new designs and technologies into the public domain
through disclosure.").
104. Elsewhere, I have argued that the states should be limited by the
Intellectual Property Clause despite the Supreme Court's rejection of that claim.
See Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability, supra note 97, at 300-326.
105. Another possible justification might be that the Founders' generation
was much more familiar with Locke than with Grotius or Pufendorf. This type of
research, however, is hostage to the happenstance of preservation, complicated
by the multiplicity of other authors who might have popularized ideas without
naming the supporting philosophers, and under-counts less scholarly ratiflers.
106. See, e.g., John Deere, 383 U.S. at 5 (stating that the Intellectual
Property Clause "was written against the backdrop of the practices - eventually
curtailed by the Statute of Monopolies - of the Crown granting monopolies to
court favorites in goods or businesses which had long before been enjoyed by
the public.").
107. The statute, whose full title is "An Act concerning Monopolies and
Dispensations with Penal Laws, and the Forfeitures thereof," reads:
Forasmuch as your most excellent Majesty, in your Royal Judgment,
and of your blessed Disposition to the Weal and Quite of your Subjects,
did in the Year of our Lord God one thousand six hundred and ten,
publish in Print to the whole Realm, and to all Posterity, That all Grants
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premier colonial exposition of English law, Blackstone's
Commentaries, 0 8 discussed this complex statute as if it
ended all "monopolies" except "patents for inventions" granted
to inventors.
and Monopolies, and of the Benefit of any Penal Laws, or of Power to
dispense with the Law, or to compound for the Forfeiture, are contrary
to your Majesty's Laws, which your Majesty's Declaration is truly
consonant and agreeable to the ancient and fundamental Laws of this
your Realm .... be it declared and enacted by Authority of this present
Parliament, That all Monopolies, and all Commissions, Grants,
Licences, Charters and Letters Patents heretobefore made or granted,
or hereafter to be made or granted, to any Person or Persons, Bodies
Politick or Corporate whatsoever, of or for the sole Buying, Selling,
Making, Working, or Using of any Thing within this Realm, or the
Dominion of Wales .... are altogether contrary to the Laws of this
Realm, and so are and shall be utterly void and of none Effect, and in
no wise to be put in Use or Execution.
V. Provided nevertheless, and be it declared and enacted, That any
Declaration before mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents
and Grants of Privilege for the Term of one and twenty Years or under,
heretofore made, of the sole Working or Making of any Manner of new
Manufacture within this Realm, to the first and true Inventor or
Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the Time of the
Making of such Letters Patents and Grants did not use, so they be not
contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by Raising of the
Prices of Commodities at home, or hurt of Trade, or generally
inconvenient, but that same shall be of such Force as they were or
should be, if this Act had not been made, and of none other: (2) And if
the same were made for more than one and twenty Years, That then the
same for the Term of one and twenty Years only, to be accounted from
the Date of the first Letters Patents and Grants thereof made, shall be
of such Force as they were or should have been, if the same had been
made but for Term of one and twenty Years only, and as if this Act had
never been had or made, and of none other.
VI. Provided also, and it be declared and enacted, That any Declaration
before mentioned shall not extend to any Letters Patents and Grants of
Privilege for the Term of fourteen Years or under, hereinafter to be
made, of the sole Working or Making of any Manner of New
Manufactures within this Realm, to the true and first Inventor and
Inventors of such Manufactures, which others at the Time of the
Making such Letters Patents and Grants shall not use, so as also they
be not contrary to the Law, nor mischievous to the State, by raising
Prices of Commodities at home, or Hurt of Trade, or generally
inconvenient: The said fourteen Years to be accounted from the Date of
the first Letters Patents, or Grant of such Privilege hereafter to be
made, but that the same shall be of such Force as they should be, if
this Act had never been made, and of none other.
Statute of Monopolies, 21 Jam., ch. 3 (1624) (Eng.) (greatly edited down).
108. See, e.g., LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 88-89
(1973) (asserting colonial reliance on the 1772 Philadelphia edition).
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Monopolies are much the same offense in other branches of
trade, that engrossing is in provisions: being a license or
privilege allowed by the king for the sole buying and selling,
making, working, or using, of anything whatever; whereby
the subject in general is restrained from that liberty of
manufacturing or trading which he had before. These had
been carried to an enormous height during the reign of
queen Elizabeth; and were heavily complained of by sir
Edward Coke, in the beginning of the reign of king James
the first; but were in great measure remedied by statute 21
Jac. I. C. 3. which declares such monopolies to be contrary
to the law and void; (except as to patents, not exceeding the
grant of fourteen years, to the authors of new
inventions;) .. 109
The Statute of Monopolies, furthermore, was known to
the American Revolutionaries as the first victory against the
royal prerogative1 ° by their ideological ancestors, the Whig
opponents of the absolutist Stuart monarchs.' Sir Edward
Coke, hero of the Statute of Monopolies fight, according to
Blackstone, described monopolies as invasions of the ancient
constitutional right of each person to practice any craft.1 1 2 As
a point of linguistic clarification, "monopolies" in this
historical context is not a technical, economic doctrine about
proven market power; it is a flexible term of disapproval
applied to disliked trade regulation."3
Madison's 1792 essay Property seems to agree with Coke:
[A man] has an equal property in the free use of his
109. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 92, at 159-60 (footnotes and discussion of
penalties omitted). Blackstone seriously oversimplifies the Statute of
Monopolies. See Pollack, Purveyance and Power, supra note 88, at text
accompanying notes 367-437.
110. See, e.g., CHARLES HOWARD MCILWAIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM ANCIENT AND
MODERN 138 (1940).
111. See, e.g., GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 623 (paperback ed. 1990); LINDA LEVY PECK, COURT PATRONAGE
AND CORRUPTION IN EARLY STUART ENGLAND 220 (1990) (asserting that fight
against early Stuart "old corruption" and related monopolies was central to
revolutionary thought).
112. See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF
ENGLAND 183-84 (William S. Hein Co. 1986) (1798).
113. During the House of Lord's debate on the Statute of Monopolies, for
example, Lord Haughton objected because "Monopolies, what, uncertyne. The
punishment is greate." Henry Elsing, NOTES OF THE DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF
LORDS, OFFICIALLY TAKEN BY HENRY ELSING, CLERK OF THE PARLIAMENTS, A.D.
1621, at 104 (ed. Samuel Rawson Gardiner, 1879, Camden Soc'y Pub. No. 103).
See also STEPHEN D. WHITE, SIR EDWARD COKE AND 'THE GRIEVANCES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH," 1621-1628, at 118-19 (1979) (flexibility of term "monopoly").
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faculties and free choice of the objects on which to employ
them.
That is not a just government, nor is property secure
under it, where arbitrary restrictions, exemptions, and
monopolies deny to part of its citizens that free use of their
faculties, and free choice of their occupations... What
must be the spirit of legislation where a manufacturer of
linen cloth is forbidden to bury his own child in a linen
shroud, in order to favor his neighbor who manufactures
woolen cloth; where the manufacturer and wearer of woolen
cloth are again forbidden the economical use of buttons of
that material in favor of the buttons of other materials1"14
Madison's statement that each man has a right not to be
denied the right to work at his chosen trade is a Located
Lockian claim right not to be excluded. The Intellectual
Property Clause allows this right to be overridden by
temporary Inventors' Exclusive Rights, which Congress has
legislated as patents.1"5 When an Inventor's Exclusive Right
sunsets, the art taught by the expired patent enters the
public domain. Madison's 1792 essay clearly asserts that
each man individually has a right not to be excluded from
practicing crafts in the public domain. Madison's statement is
clear evidence that one Framer, at least, almost
contemporaneously with drafting the Constitution, saw the
public domain as a Lockian owned common. This is exactly
the view of the public domain implied in the Supreme Court's
early cases; a point I will discuss next.
In sum, the constitutional history of patents demands
that we see the public domain as a Lockian owned
common. 116
114. Madison, supra note 67, at 599. The colonial view on the importance of
banning monopolies was so strong that one scholar has argued that the ban is
an unenumerated right protected by the Ninth Amendment. See Michael
Conant, Antimonopoly Tradition Under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments:
Slaughter-House Cases Reexamined, 31 EMORY L. J. 785, 801-02 (1982).
115. See35U.S.C.§§ 1-14.
116. This analysis is not foreclosed in reference to the Intellectual Property
Clause by the Supreme Court's refusal to protect against non-intellectual
property state restrictions on the job market. See, e.g., The Slaughter House
Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 80-81 (1872) (denying Takings Clause attack on Louisiana
statute limiting ability to butcher animals, despite plaintiffs' reliance on the
Statute of Monopolies). Because of the Intellectual Property Clause, the federal
government has a different role in relation to intellectual property than it has in
relationship to other claimed "property" entitlements. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 8. Property entitlements, generally, are creatures of state law. See, e.g.,
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Supreme Court Case Law: The Bargain Theory of
Patents
The Supreme Court's classic cases on expired patents
7
support my reading of the Intellectual Property Clause. These
cases treat a patent grant as a contract-like bargain between
the inventor and the public, a bargain in which the federal
government's patent administrator is the public's agent.""
The patentee obtains a time-limited right to exclude others
from making, using, or selling his invention. In return, the
patentee discloses his invention to the public so that, at the
end of the patent term, the public has the ability to practice
the invention.
Contract terminology is used repeatedly in one of the
Court's earliest patent cases,"9 Grant v. Raymond:20
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992) (in Takings
Clause jurisprudence, the Court "traditional[ly] resort[s] to existing rules or
understandings of [property rights] that stem from an independent source such
as state law.") (internal quotations and citation omitted): accord City of Boerne
v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 518 (1997) (under Section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Congress has broad power to remedy state actions restricting life,
liberty, and property, but Congress does not have power to redefine the
substance of these rights).
117. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Coats v. Merrick Thread, Co., 149
U.S. 562 (1893).
118. Many others have noted this bargain language. See, e.g., Douglas
Y'Barbo, Is Extrinsic Evidence Necessary to Decide Claim Construction Disputes?
(Part IV, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'Y 101, 133 n.44 (referring to "the
familiar 'bargain theory of patents.'") (citation omitted).
119. On July 31, 2000, I conducted a search in WESTLAW database sct-old
(which allegedly includes all Supreme Court cases before 1832) for cases using
the word "patent." Most of the retrieved cases were about land patents or
patents granting corporate charters. A few cases included references to patents
of various types, but did not involve disputes concerning patents of invention.
The following are the only cases before 1832 that did involve such disputes.
Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. 1, 23 (1829) (holding that public use of invention
before date of patent application voids patent; in one sentence using words
implying bargain theory of patents, "There would be no quid pro quo - no price
for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the inventor for fourteen
years."); Keplinger v. De Young, 23 U.S. 358 (1825) (mem) (discussing jury
instruction on extent of exclusive rights of patentee; no language of contract
between public and patentee); Ex parte Wood & Brundage, 22 U.S. 603 (1824)
(construing patent statute's judicial procedure requirements; no contract
language); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824) (patent issues not discussed by
Court; suit involved state patents on steamboats, but Court decided on basis of
Commerce Clause); Evans v. Eaton, 20 U.S. 356 (1822) (mem) (holding that
patent for improvement in a machine is void for failure to clearly explain the
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[Ilt cannot be doubted that the settled purpose of the
United States has ever been and continues to be, to confer
on the authors of useful inventions an exclusive right in
their inventions for the time mentioned in their patent. It is
the reward stipulated for the advantages derived by the
public for the exertions of the individual, and is intended as
a stimulus to those exertions. The laws which are passed to
give effect to this purpose ought, we think, to be construed
in the spirit in which they have been made; and to execute
the contract fairly on the part of the United States, where the
full benefit of the discovery, after its enjoyment by the
discoverer for fourteen years, is preserved . 121
The communication of the discovery to the public has been
made in pursuance of law, with the intent to exercise a
privilege which is the consideration paid by the public for the
future use of the machine.
1 22
The third section [of the statute] requires, as preliminary to
a patent, a correct specification and description of the thing
discovered. This is necessary in order to give the public,
after the privilege shall expire, the advantage for which the
privilege is allowed, and is the foundation of the power to
issue the patent.
2 3
The Court's most recent cases continue to use the
contract analogy. The patent system represents "a carefully
crafted bargain," according to the Court in 1989,124 and again
in 1999.125
nature of the improvement not using contract language): Evans v. Eaton, 16
U.S. 454, 507 (1818) (mem) (granting new trial in patent infringement suit;
using some language commonly used in contract cases: "The next object of
inquiry is the intention of the parties .... The parties are the government,
acting by Its agents, and Oliver Evans."); Evans v. Morehead, 13 U.S. 199
(1815) (mem) (construing exception from damages in patent statute enacted for
specific relief of Oliver Evans; failing to discuss any wider issues than statutory
construction; no contract language): Tyler v. Tuel, 10 U.S. 324 (1810) (mem)
(holding that assignee of less than full interest in a patent lacks standing to sue
for infringement; no discussion of patentee's relationship to public: no contract
language).
120. 31 U.S. 218 (1832).
121. Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 244 (emphasis added).
123. Id. at 247 (emphasis added).
124. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 150-51
(1989) ("The federal patent system thus embodies a carefully crafted bargain for
encouraging the creation and disclosure of new, useful, and nonobvious
advances in technology and design in return for the exclusive right to practice
the invention for a period of years.").
125. Pfaffv. Wells Electronics, Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 63 (1999) ("As we have often
explained, most recently in Bonito Boats... the patent system represents a
carefully crafted bargain that encourages both the creation and the public
disclosure of new and useful advances in technology, in return for an exclusive
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When a patent expires and the former patent holder
asserts a trade dress right in some aspect of the formerly
patented product's configuration, the question presented is
the exact consideration exchanged in the patent bargain.
Four circuits who have reached this question have
answered by invoking the trade dress doctrine of
"functionality."'26 Let us consider Marketing Displays because
that case is currently before the Supreme Court.
Marketing Displays, Inc. held utility patents on a wind-
resistant sign. Competitor TrafFix Devices waited until after
the utility patents expired and then began marketing an
almost identical product. Marketing Displays sued. The
district court held that the expired patent barred a trade
dress claim. The Sixth Circuit reversed and remanded. The
circuit recognized that the issue was 'Vhether a utility patent
disclosure forecloses trade dress protection,"1 27 but reduced
that question to the trade dress issue of functionality. It
ordered the trial court "to do a functional analysis of the
trade dress unencumbered by any presumptions other than
the ordinary burden of proof assumed by the plaintiff."
128
Functionality is a doctrine that prevents trade dress in
features which should not be "monopolized" without proving
the non-obviousness required to obtain patent protection. A
product aspect is "functional" if "it is essential to the use or
purpose of the article or if it affects the cost or quality of the
article, that is, if exclusive use of the feature would put




If the consideration question is reduced to functionality,
the bargain concept of patent almost evaporates. Every trade
dress plaintiff needs to prove non-functionality, not just the
holders of expired patents; only the holders of expired
monopoly for a limited period of time.").
126. See Marketing Displays, Inc. v. TrafFix Devices, Inc., 200 F.3d 929 (6th
Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 2715 (2000) (wind resistant road signs);
Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc. 175 F.3d 1356 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(trailers); cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 527 (1999); Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit
Corp., 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998) (cable ties); Sunbeam Prods., Inc. v. West
Bend Co., 123 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 1997) (stand mixers).
127. Marketing Displays, 200 F.3d at 939.
128. Id. at 940.
129. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995) (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted).
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patents, however, have received from the public the
"consideration" of a "monopoly" term. Under this view, the
"consideration" that the public received for the patent,
therefore, is only the art disclosure in the patent documents.
If manufacturing would have revealed the art details (as
seems clear in the case of Marketing Display's signs), the
public has received no consideration whatsoever from the
patent holder.
The bargain is even more lopsided. Patentability does not
require a showing of competitive need. Many product aspects
can be patentable (i.e. useful, novel, nonobvious) and still not
be trade dress functional (required for competition because
no substitutes exist).130 An applicant can obtain a utility
patent, therefore, without showing its invention has trade
dress "functionality," but can retain after the expiration of the
patent any product detail which is not "functional."
The Tenth Circuit requires slightly more consideration
from a patent holder. In Vomado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v.
Duracraft Corp., that circuit held that the patent holder could
not claim as trade dress anything that was "a significant
inventive component of an invention covered by a utility
patent."1 3  The circuit reached this conclusion without
mentioning the Bargain Theory of Patents or relying on the
Constitution. 132
In its classic cases on expired patents,3 3 the Supreme
130. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498,
1506 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Configurations can simultaneously be patentable,
useful, novel, and nonobvious and also nonfunctional, in trade dress
parlance.").
131. Id at 1500.
132. See ld. at 1505 n.15.
133. See Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938); Singer Mfg.
Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Coats v. Merrick Thread, Co., 149
U.S. 562 (1893). The Supreme Court has discussed closely related issues in
other cases. See Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141
(1989) (federal patent "system" pre-empts state law barring plug molding of boat
hulls); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964) (patent
preemption of state unfair competition claim on configuration of pole lamp;
utility patent on lamp had earlier been declared invalid); Compco Corp. v. Day-
Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964) (same). Looking at the issue broadly,
these pro-competition decisions are congruent with Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Samara Bros., 120 S. C.t. 1339 (2000) (Lanham Act protection of unregistered
trade dress in product configurations requires a showing of secondary meaning)
and in tension with Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159 (1995)
(color alone is protectable as trade dress under the Lanham Act); Two Pesos,
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Court demanded much more "consideration" from the patent
holder. Let us look closely at the most famous case, Kellogg
Co. v. National Biscuit Co.
34
Kellogg involved shredded wheat. The National Biscuit
Company was the successor in interest to Henry D. Perky
who invented this breakfast food. The product and process
were protected by United States Utility Patent No. 548, 086
issued October 15, 1895 (the '086 Patent). 35 Long after
expiration of the patent, National Biscuit sued competitor
Kellogg under the theory of unfair competition. National
Biscuit attempted to assert trademark rights in the words
"shredded wheat" and trade dress rights in the pillow-shape
of the marketed biscuit. 136 The Supreme Court refused to
enforce either, yet never asked if the "pillow shape" was "a




The pillow shape was not mentioned in the '086 patent.
The claims read:
1. A food or bread composed of superposed or massed
layers or deposits of dry externally, rough, porous, sinuous
threads or filaments of cooked whole wheat containing
intermixed the bran, starch, and gluten of the entire berry,
and which is absolutely free from leavening or raising
material, or their products.
2. The process of reducing cereals for food consisting, first,
in cooking the grain with salt, after it has been thoroughly
cleaned, without destroying the whole berry form, second,
partially drying the grain with constant agitation until its
interior and exterior portions are of substantially the same
consistency, and finally, compressing the grain to
intimately commingle the outer or bran coats, in the form of
porous, rough filaments or threads, substantially as
described. 
'38
The descriptive portion of the patent asserted that "[tihe
food as discharged from the rolls is ready for use without
Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763 (1992) (inherently distinctive trade
dress is protectable under the Lanham Act without secondary meaning);
Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp, 416 U.S. 470 (1974) (trade secret is not
preempted by federal patent law). This article applies the Lockian owned public
domain only where the argument is most compelling, to trade dress claims in
expired utility patents.
134. 305 U.S. 111 (1938).
135. Id. at 112; U.S. Patent No. 548,086 (issued October 15, 1895).
136. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 112.
137. IA at 123.
138. U.S. Patent No. 548,086 (issued October 15, 1895) at p.2, 11.23-42.
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further cooking, or it can be shaped for baking in various
11139ways.
The Supreme Court opinion could be read as partially, at
least, depending on the "functionality" of the pillow shape:
"[m]oreover, the pillow-shape must be used [by competitors]
for another reason. The evidence is persuasive that this form
is functional - that the cost of the biscuit would be increased
and its high quality lessened if some other form where
substituted for the pillow-shape." 4 °
The Supreme Court mispoke. The only mention of
functionality in the decisions below is the trial court's quote
from a different case involving the same product, Shredded
Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co. The Humphrey circuit
court is quoted as giving several reasons for supporting the
defendant and then continuing:
Moreover, I think that the form and size of the biscuit as
always made by the complainant are functional, and that
imitation of these features is not evidence of unfair
competition. The form evidently tends to strengthen a
product made out of such fragile material and the size is
apparently the best fitted for use as a breakfast food on a
saucer.
This quote, however, is from the dissent in Humphrey.
The Humphrey majority opinion, by no other than Judge
Learned Hand, says that the form of the biscuit was
dedicated to the public by the expiration of a design patent.' 2
As for findings of fact about the "functionality" of the pillow
shape, the Humphrey District Court said the opposite:
[Tihere was then, and for quite a time previous thereto had
been, other forms of shredded wheat biscuit, which could
be and were easily identified from the product of the
plaintiff ....
The visual appearance of the defendants' product ... [was]
adopted by the plaintiff, not because of any inherent or
functional advantage or value resulting therefrom, but
purely as a matter of accident resulting from the size and
shape of the rolls of the plaintiffs machinery from which it
was discharged ready for use. Indeed there is an apparent
disadvantage in the shape and size of the product as made
139. Id. at p.1, 11.96-98.
140. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 121-22.
141. Kellogg, 24 U.S P.Q. 138, 142 (D. Del. 1935) (quoting Shredded Wheat
Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 250 F. 960, 967 (2d Cir. 1918)).
142. See Humphrey, 250 F. at 964.
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by the plaintiff and copied by the defendants .... 43
Other than this disingenuous quote, the Kellogg district
court said nothing about functionality. On appeal, the Third
Circuit originally affirmed judgment for defendant because of
the donation to the public domain made by the expired
patents. 4 On rehearing, the Third Circuit reversed without
mentioning functionality. Nor was functionality mentioned
when the mandate was clarified to stiffen the wording of the
injunction against the defendant."41 When Kellogg reached the
Supreme Court the parties were still disputing functionality -
with neither claiming support from the courts below.
14 6
"Functionality," furthermore, is not mentioned in the Court's
earlier cases holding that on the expiration of a patent the
article manufactured can be made by competitors.1
7
I read Kellogg as firmly based on the dedication of
patented material to the public - the Bargain Theory of
Patent. What was dedicated, furthermore, was neither the
claims of the patent, nor the inventive aspect of the patent,
but rather "the right to make the article as it was made
during the patent period" as well as "the right to apply thereto
143. Shredded Wheat Co. v. Humphrey Cornell Co., 244 F. 508, 512 (D.
Conn. 1917), affd with modification, 250 F. 960 (2d Cir. 1918). I would have
argued that the shape was functional because it was less expensive; the
product could be marketed without reshaping after it came out of the rollers.
The court, however, did not say this. One additional point, under the then-
current doctrine of collateral estoppel, since no mutuality of estoppel was
possible, the holding in Humphrey was not binding on the plaintiff in Kellogg,
even though the case seemingly involved its predecessor in interest. See Wright,
Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice & Procedure: Jurisdiction §§ 4462, 4464 (2d
ed. 1987) (explaining doctrine of mutuality of estoppel and the timing of its
demise).
144. See Kellogg, 28 U.S.P.Q. 179, 179 (3d Cr. 1936), affirming 24 U.S.P.Q.
138 (D.Del. 1935).
145. See Kellogg, 91 F.2d 150 (3d Cir. 1937), modified by, 96 F.2d 873
(1938).
146. Compare Brief for Petitioner at 57-66, 108-12, Kellogg Co. v. National
Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111 (1938) (Nos. 2 & 56) (arguing form is functional) with
Brief for Respondent at 19-32, 40-42, Kellogg, 305 U.S. 111 (arguing form is not
functional). The design patent also seems extraneous to the Supreme Court's
decision because it was held invalid. See Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 118 n.4. The
Humphrey district court, furthermore, saw the design patent as protecting the
"fibrous interstitial appearance" of the biscuit, not its shape. Humphrey, 244 F.
at 514. The Court did, however, hold that material covered by an expired design
patent enters the public domain. See Coats v. Merrick Thread, Co., 149 U.S.
562 (1893) (refusing unfair competition claim).
147. See Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169 (1896); Coats v.
Merrick Thread Co., 149 U.S. 562 (1893).
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the name by which it had become known, " " and "the good
will of the article."49 Since the Court has recently held that
trade dress in unregistered product configurations requires a
showing of secondary meaning, 0 and "secondary meaning" is
the "good will of the article," Kellogg now supplies two
reasons for insisting that the holder of an expired utility
patent may not use trade dress theory to exclude others from
marketing a product identical in appearance to the ones sold
under patent protection.
The size of the consideration demanded of the patent
holder is not inequitable. The "good will" and "secondary
meaning" were created in a market emptied of competition by
the patent. The patent holder, furthermore, still retains
significant first mover advantages. No other market entrant
can use his well established brand name on the product,
label it as "the original,"15 ' or publicly claim longer experience
with the product.
The size of the consideration demanded of the patent
holder does not rest only on established precedent. The
Supreme Court's measure of the consideration matches the
thesis of this article, despite the fact that the Court has never
mentioned a Lockian owned public domain, or discussed
Madison's essay Property as a historical connection between
the Intellectual Property Clause and this owned public
domain.
In a Lockian owned public domain, each member of the
rights-bearing community (i.e. all persons in the United
States) have an inalienable right not to be excluded. The
Intellectual Property Clause allows Congress to create only
time-limited rights to exclude. When an Inventor's Exclusive
Right (IER) ends, therefore, the default position returns - the
public has rights not to be excluded. The clause limits federal
power for the sake of individual rights. Congress may not
bypass this limit by using the more generalized Commerce
148. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 111.
149. Id. at 122.
150. See Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 1339 (2000).
151. Kellogg violated this rule of truthfulness to the outrage of the Third
Circuit. See Kellogg, 91 F.2d at 155 ("[The] defendant not only adopted the
name and form of plaintiffs product, but also claimed that its product was the
original and by implication that the plaintiffs was an imitation.").
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Clause power - for example by using the Lanham Act. 152 The
states may not grant greater rights because such action
would undermine the federal "patent system."
153
Looking at Madison on Property we also reach the same
result. Madison adopted Blackstone's explanation of Coke's
position: the ancient constitution of English person's liberty
includes a right to engage in one's chosen business activity.
Short-lived patents for inventors are an exception.'T Anything
else is a tyrannical "monopoly." "Monopoly" in this context is
not a technical term of art requiring a showing of market
power. Any disliked limit on competition will do. A patent is a
temporary right to oust others from the freedom to engage in
a commercial activity. The insult to freedom is not
conditioned on the anachronistic concept of market power.
V
Conclusion
Five circuits have treated Supreme Court case law as if it
were outmoded. This article has demonstrated that the
Court's case law barring trade dress protection for any aspect
of a product earlier produced under shelter of a utility patent
is the rational result of a Lockian owned public domain, an
interpretation congruent with the historical background of
the Intellectual Property Clause. The Supreme Court should
use TraJFix Devices, Inc. v. Marketing Displays, Inc. to reaffirm
the doctrines enunciated in Kellogg.
152. See Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 471
(1982) (Congress may not bypass the "uniformity" requirement in the
Bankruptcy Clause by appealing to the Commerce Clause). For a more detailed
discussion of this point, see Pollack, Unconstitutional Incontestability,
supra note 97, at 270-74; Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?, 17 CARDOZO AELJ
47, 55-66 (1999).
153. Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 977-78; see also Pollack, Unconstitutional
Incontestability, supra note 97, at 300-26 (arguing that states are bound by the
Intellectual Property Clause).
154. The only exception mentioned in the colonial Blackstone.
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